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Abstract We exploit the natural experiment of the 2005 income tax reform in Germany to 
study the effects of tax incentives on consumer behavior in life insurance markets. Our 
empirical analysis of sociodemographic, economic, and psychological household 
characteristics elicited in the German SAVE study shows that two very different consumer 
groups buy (endowment) life insurance before and after the tax reform. We find that 
education plays a central role in reactions to the modified tax environment. Our stylized 
characterization of “arbitrageur” and “straggler” buyers will assist both life insurance firms 
and regulatory authorities design effective policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two related trends can be observed in international life insurance and pension markets: first, 
less generous social welfare systems force individuals to take more responsibility for their 
financial security and, second, governments try to influence this process by changing the tax 
incentives for household consumption and savings decisions. One prominent example of this 
situation is U.S. 401(k) retirement saving plans, which benefit from deferred income taxes on 
contributions and earnings. However, budget constraints regularly require fiscal authorities to 
reduce or eliminate tax advantages—with severe consequences for consumer behavior. The 
U.S. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, for example, eliminated most tax advantages of 
endowment life insurance contracts. Since then, these policies, which combine savings 
accumulation with death benefit coverage, are only very rarely sold in the United States 
(Dorfman, 2002, pp. 280–281). A similar situation can be seen in Germany: generous tax 
exemptions for premium payments and survival benefits made endowment insurance the most 
popular form of life insurance for decades.1 With enactment of the Retirement Income Act on 
January 1, 2005, however, endowment insurance policies lost their substantial tax advantage 
over alternative investments. The effects are clearly seen in the number of new endowment 
insurance policies written in Germany: after a sharp increase of 66.4% in 2004 attributable to 
a “sales effect,” the new endowment insurance business decreased drastically by 63.7% in 
2005 and has continued to decrease ever since (see Figure 1). 
 
In this study, we exploit the “natural experiment” of the 2005 tax reform in Germany to 
analyze characteristics of endowment insurance buyers and draw general conclusions about 
the effects of tax incentives on life insurance demand. Our analysis is based on the German 
                                                 
1 The most common form of German life insurance policies [Kapitallebensversicherung] is sometimes translated 
as “whole life insurance”; the actual equivalent is “endowment insurance.” These policies pay out all accrued 
savings at the end of the policy term or the lump sum insured in case of premature death of the insured. 
Furthermore, they typically participate in the insurer’s profits that exceed the guaranteed minimum interest rate. 
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SAVE study, a rich panel data set offering detailed information on households’ financial, 
sociodemographic, and psychological characteristics. We focus on the actual purchasing 
decision (instead of analyzing intentions to buy insurance), and use the panel structure of the 
SAVE survey to identify endowment insurance purchases. Thanks to the comprehensive 
information on individuals’ life insurance consumption, we can separate endowment 
insurance from term life insurance demand and thus provide a clean-cut econometric analysis. 
 
Our study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it examines the demand 
for endowment insurance on the microeconomic level of the household, incorporating a large 
set of economic, sociodemographic, and psychological indicators. Our analysis includes the 
household’s direct assessment of key features of endowment insurance policies. Second, the 
natural experiment of the 2005 tax reform is used to classify households that (do not) vary 
their decision to buy life insurance in response to the tax reform according to their self-
reported characteristics. Our resulting characterization of “arbitrageurs”—those who bought 
insurance before the reform—and “stragglers”—those who purchased afterward—provides 
valuable information for insurance firms and regulatory authorities: insurers need to know 
their customers’ (price-) sensitivity to changes in product characteristics and tax treatment, 
and the design of effective regulation requires reliable information on the reaction of market 
participants. 
 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the role of 
endowment insurance policies in Germany. A brief overview of relevant literature on life 
insurance demand follows. We then derive a model of endowment insurance demand and 
derive testable hypotheses that form the basis for the empirical analysis. We next describe our 
data and methodology. Empirical results are subsequently presented. Our conclusions are set 
out in the final section. 
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ENDOWMENT INSURANCE IN GERMANY 
Endowment insurance has been a bestseller in the German life insurance market for decades. 
Between 1975 and 1990, endowment policies accounted for about 60% of all newly written 
individual life insurance contracts (see Figure 1). A historic peak was reached after German 
Reunification in 1990 when 16 million new citizens entered the insurance market. In the mid 
1990s, however, sales started to gradually decline due to the rising popularity of pension and 
annuity products. This downward trend was interrupted two times. In 1999, an increase of 
about 42% is observed due to the anticipated 2000 tax reform that halved the tax exemption 
limit for capital income. The second, and much higher, increase in the number of new 
endowment polices was induced by the German Retirement Income Act of 2005 (12% in 
2003 and another 66% in 2004), which is the focus of our study. 
 
Figure 1 
New business in endowment insurance in Germany, number of policies and percentage share 






















































Note: Own calculation on the basis of data from GDV (2009a). 
 
The consequences for endowment insurance business in force are illustrated in Figure 2. After 
having reached a peak of almost 64 million contracts in 1995, this line of business decreased 
to 48 million contracts in 2008. Premium income, however, has remained relatively stable, 
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with 31 billion EUR in 1995 and 28 billion EUR in 2008. So, endowment insurance still plays 
an important role in the German life insurance market.  
 
Figure 2 
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Source: Own calculation on the basis of data from GDV (2009b). 
 
Endowment insurance policies in Germany have enjoyed a long tradition of special tax 
treatment (see, e.g., Mauch, 1994). These privileges date back to the 1891 Prussian income 
tax law, which provided for setting off premium payments against tax liability and for a full 
tax exemption for accrued gains. Since then, the law has undergone only slight modifications, 
mainly having to do with the maximum tax-deductible premium amount and conditions for 
the policy returns to be eligible for tax exemption, such as minimum duration or use of funds 
(Waldow, 2002). The two key features of the 1891 law, however, remained essentially 
unchanged for decades. Thus, for endowment insurance contracts closed as late as 2004, 
premium payments were partially tax deductible as “special expenses” up to a threshold that 
varied by marital status and type of employment.2 Insurance benefits were fully tax exempt if 
at maturity the policyholder was older than 60, the contract has been in force for 12 years, 
                                                 
2 Compared to the tax exemption for insurance benefits, premium deductibility is a subordinate tax advantage 
since the “special expenses” threshold is typically exhausted by households’ obligatory contributions to the 
social security system. 
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premiums had been paid for at least five consecutive years, and the death protection 
component accounted for at least 60% of insurance benefits (§10 Para. 1 No. 3b, EStG 2005). 
 
On January 1, 2005, however, the Retirement Income Act (Alterseinkünftegesetz) 
substantially changed the fiscal treatment of endowment insurance policies in Germany. The 
act constituted a response to the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
March 2002 holding that the differential taxation of civil servants’ pensions and payments 
from the German public pension system is incompatible with the principle of equality set 
forth in the Basic Constitutional Law (German Federal Ministry of Finance, 2005a). The act 
introduced the transition to a downstream taxation (i.e., tax exemption of premium payments 
for old-age provision and taxation of retirement income) with the goal of promoting annuity 
products (German Federal Ministry of Finance, 2005a). To make endowment insurance (with 
lump-sum payment at maturity) more equal to other capital investment products, its special 
treatment in the tax system was abolished. The abolishment of tax privileges was justified by 
the fact that lump-sum benefits do not provide life-long retirement income (German Federal 
Ministry of Finance, 2005a). 
 
The modified income tax act makes lump-sum insurance benefits of endowment plans subject 
to the personal income tax rate of the policyholder. If, however, insurance benefits are paid 
after age 60 and the contract has been in force for 12 years, only half the taxable insurance 
earnings (i.e., the difference of maturity payment and paid premiums) are included in the 
policyholder’s personal income tax. If these conditions are not met, insurance earnings are 
taxed fully. Premium payments are no longer tax deductible (German Federal Ministry of 
7 
Finance, 2005b). Figure 3 summarizes the changes in the tax treatment of endowment 
insurance policies before January 1, 2005 and afterward.3 
 
Figure 3 
Tax treatment of endowment insurance policies with lump-sum payments at maturity before 
and after the German Retirement Income Act 
until 31 December 2004 from 1 January 2005 (until 31 December 2008)
Policyholder is beyond age 60 Policyholder is beyond age 60
Contract duration of at least 12 years Contract duration of at least 12 years
Premium payment for five consecutive years
Death protection is at least 60% of insurance benefits
Premiums not tax 
deductible
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3 Since January 1, 2009, returns from maturity, termination, or sale of endowment insurance policies are, in 
general, subject to the final withholding tax rate of 25%. If the half earnings tax procedure is applicable, 
endowment insurance policies are taxed with the personal income tax if matured or terminated. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
We use the 2005 income tax reform in Germany to empirically analyze the effects of tax 
incentives on individual life insurance demand. Results of our study contribute to a number of 
different streams of the insurance literature, which are briefly reviewed here. We follow a 
general-to-specific approach in this literature review, beginning with the literature on life 
insurance demand followed by the literature on endowment insurance covering specific 
aspects, such as financial literacy or East/West German differences. 
 
The seminal studies by Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969, 1970), and Merton (1969, 1971) 
provide the theoretical foundation for most empirical studies on life insurance demand. Zietz 
(2003) gives an extensive overview of empirical findings on the determinants of individual 
life insurance demand. She summarizes key demographic and economic factors, and points 
out other related aspects, such as risk aversion, bequest motives, and inflation. Recent studies 
add several new aspects to these findings. Chang (2005) finds social networks to be essential 
for household saving and investment information. Such networks are used most often by those 
with least wealth; wealthier households are more likely to turn to paid financial professionals 
and the media. Using cross-section data for 30 OECD countries, Li et al. (2007) find 
sociodemographic factors and product market characteristics to be significant influences on 
life insurance demand. Carson and Fier (2009) find increased risk awareness due to the 
occurrence of catastrophic events to be a driver of life insurance demand, and Carson et al. 
(2009) provide evidence that life events play a major role in life insurance purchase decisions. 
 
Results concerning the sign of single factors, however, differ substantially. For example, 
Anderson and Nevin (1975) and Hau (2000) observe a positive relationship between 
household wealth and life insurance demand; they argue that higher financial assets require 
higher coverage via life insurance to ensure an upscale standard of living. In contrast, Fortune 
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(1973) and Lewis (1989) report a negative effect of financial wealth on life insurance demand 
and explain this finding by the increased opportunity of using “internal hedging” as financial 
assets increase. These contrasting findings are possibly due to different time periods, data 
sources, or empirical methods used in the respective analyses. The type of life insurance 
products analyzed differs as well: some studies consider term life insurance and life insurance 
policies with savings components separately (Neumann, 1969; Anderson and Nevin, 1975; 
Ferber and Lee, 1980; Hau, 2000), whereas others do not distinguish between the two (see, 
e.g., Browne and Kim, 1993; Showers and Shotick, 1994; Gandolfi and Miners, 1996).  
 
Endowment life insurance is an attractive investment vehicle as it pays out regardless of 
whether the insured lives or dies within a certain time period. There are some empirical 
studies on endowment insurance demand; many of them focus on the German market: 
Wähling et al. (1993) analyze consumer motives and find bequest and old-age provision 
motives to be most dominant for endowment insurance demand. Brunsbach and Lang (1998) 
calculate that an average household could achieve a 54% higher after-tax return with 
endowment insurance saving than with any other form of asset formation. Surprisingly, 
however, the authors observe no demand-increasing effect of this tax privilege. Müller (1998) 
identifies security aspects, asset formation, bequest, old-age provision, and capital investment 
as the five leading motives for endowment insurance demand. Further, he finds product 
specifics, such as the extreme planning horizon of endowment insurance policies (on average 
31 years; GDV, 2006), the relatively high level of premium payments, and the altruistic 
nature of dependents’ protection, to be significant in consumer purchasing decisions. Walliser 
and Winter (1998) study data from the German Consumer Expenditure Survey (EVS), finding 
that both bequest motives and tax incentives are driving forces of endowment insurance 
demand. They show that the influence of external factors on life insurance demand changes 
10 
significantly if a savings component is added, which illustrates the importance of controlling 
for the specifics of endowment insurance. 
 
The focus of our study is the effect of the substantial 2005 German retirement income tax 
reform on endowment insurance demand. A very recent study by Sauter, Walliser, and Winter 
(2010) on the effects of the 2000 tax reform that halved the tax exemption limit for capital 
income in Germany provides an interesting comparison with our work. Using data from the 
German Socioeconomic Panel Study, they find that the demand for life insurance increased 
strongly among households affected by the 2000 tax reform. Summarizing a large number of 
other empirical studies, however, Sauter, Walliser, and Winter (2010) point out that the 
evidence on the importance of tax incentives for individual saving decisions is mixed. For 
example, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003) find that abolishment of tax advantages in Italy has no 
effect on the decision to purchase life insurance or on the amount invested. They argue that 
lack of knowledge about the tax incentives might explain this rather surprising finding.  
 
Indeed, an optimal consumer reaction requires information on the tax reform, ability to 
understand the implications of it, and the capacity to adapt investment decisions accordingly. 
Therefore, an extensive body of literature addresses the issue of education, in particular 
financial literacy, in the context of retirement planning (see Bucher-Koenen, 2009, for a 
recent overview) Financial illiteracy appears to be widespread among the U.S. population and 
leads to significant gaps in old age income (see, e.g., Hogarth and Hilgert, 2002; Moore, 
2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006). For Germany, the evidence is mixed: some studies (see, 
e.g., Leinert and Wagner, 2004; Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, 2008) observe low levels 
of financial literacy, but Bucher-Koenen (2009) reports good financial knowledge measured 
on the basis of three financial literacy questions proposed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2006).  
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Bucher-Koenen (2009) finds that East and West Germans are equally financially literate when 
controlling for differences in income, wealth and education. Other studies document still 
considerable East-West differences in key aspects related to individual financial decision-
making. For example, Tigges et al. (2000) show that individuals in East Germany have a 
higher financial risk aversion than West Germans, and Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) 
observe that East Germans are more in favor of state intervention in social policies. Apart 
from differences in preferences substantial economic differences between the (former 
socialist) East and West Germany remain. For example, Uhlig (2008) shows that low wages, 
high unemployment and increasing reliance on social security persist across wide regions of 
East Germany. We find it therefore necessary to control for differences between East and 
West Germans in our analysis of endowment insurance demand.  
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING ENDOWMENT INSURANCE DEMAND 
Building on the above-cited literature, we conceptualize endowment insurance demand as the 
result of the process pictured in Figure 4. Sociodemographic, economic, and psychological 
consumer characteristics, together with consumer evaluation of typical product features of 
endowment insurance, are determinants of a subjective disposition to buy endowment life 
insurance, which could be considered as a sort of initial demand for endowment insurance. 
However, only if the insurance-inclined household has sufficient financial resources (i.e., also 
has the objective ability to actually buy endowment insurance) will there be an actual 
insurance purchase. Thus, it is the interplay of subjective and objective conditions that results 
in the purchase decision (or not)—the outcome most of interest to life insurance companies. 
Based on this framework, we use the variation introduced by the natural experiment of the 
2005 German tax reform to examine the characteristics of households that respond to tax 
reforms by varying their decision to buy life insurance. We focus on the following research 
questions:  
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• Do buyers of endowment insurance before the German Retirement Income Act 
(Consumer Group I) differ significantly from buyers of endowment insurance after the tax 
reform (Consumer Group II)?  
• Are financial literacy and education important factors in distinguishing between 
Consumer Group I and Consumer Group II?  
 
We investigate these questions using empirical data and use the results of this analysis to 
characterize endowment insurance buyers before and after the tax reform according to their 
sociodemographic, economic, and psychological traits. 
 
Figure 4 
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Psychological/Behavioral 
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Literacy, Use of Information Channels, 
Other Psychological Traits  
Endowment Insurance Purchase 
(Consumer’s Evaluation of) 
Product Features 
Death Protection for Dependents, 
Savings Component, Tax Exemptions,  
(Long) Length of Planning Horizon, 
(Low) Risk Profile of Investment  
(Subjective) Disposition to Buy (Objective) Ability to Buy 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Our study is based on the SAVE panel, which is a rich micro-level survey conducted by the 
Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA) on the financial situation of 
households in Germany. The survey focuses on savings and old-age provision and collects 
detailed quantitative information on households’ financial structure and relevant socio-
psychological aspects. The study began in 2001 as a biennial panel, but has been conducted 
yearly since 2005. In 2004, parts of the household survey “TPI Access Panel” administered by 
the company TNS Infratest TPI were included. Since then, SAVE consists of two panels: the 
“Random Sample” started in 2003 and the “Access Panel.” Börsch-Supan et al. (2008) find 
that the two samples exhibit very similar characteristics. 
 
Households in SAVE also report whether they own endowment insurance. The corresponding 
question explicitly rules out term life insurance policies (i.e., policies that only pay out in case 
of premature death and do not include a savings component), which is most important for a 
clear-cut analysis of the saving motives of endowment insurance buyers. However, possible 
answers can include children’s endowment insurance and funeral expense insurance, both of 
which represent negligible market shares compared to classic endowment insurance. Yet, to 
avoid any confusion, we restrict our sample to those households where the household head is 
65 years old or younger. 65 is the current statutory retirement age for men and women in 
Germany; it provides a rather high upper age bound for the financial advantageousness of 
endowment insurance. 
 
We use SAVE’s panel structure to identify new endowment insurance purchases by analyzing 
a change in ownership status from one year to the next, and focus on households who bought 
endowment insurance in the years before (Consumer Group I) and after (Consumer Group II) 
enactment of the German Retirement Income Act on January 1, 2005. Corresponding data 
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covering the year 2003 consist of households surveyed in the 2004 “Access Panel.” To 
capture the “Random Sample” as well, we also include in Consumer Group I those 
households that bought endowment insurance in 2003. Consumer Group II is made up of 
2005 households only, the first year after the tax reform, because in mid 2006, the tax 
treatment of endowment insurance was again widely discussed in connection with the Final 
Withholding Tax (Abgeltungsteuer), which was enacted on January 1, 2009. 
 
The SAVE survey allows us to study all key drivers of endowment insurance demand 
identified in the literature review, and Table 1 provides an overview of sociodemographic, 
economic and psychological household characteristics included as explanatory variables. To 
compare buyers of endowment insurance before and after the tax reform, we employ two 
complementary methods for quantitative group comparisons. In a first step, we analyze 
compositional differences between the two consumer groups (differences in composition). 
Bivariate statistics are used to compare the two groups in detail, and t tests are used to identify 
significant differences. This method gives a first indication of how pre- and post-tax-reform 
consumers differ as to single features. In a second step, multivariate regression analysis is 
used to analyze and compare the effect of explanatory variables on endowment insurance 
demand (differences in effects).4 
 
                                                 
4 Weights used for descriptive statistics and regressions in this paper are based on the income and age 
distribution of the German Microcensus. All results use the fully imputed SAVE data set, which is based on an 
iterative multiple imputation procedure (Schunk, 2008). 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Bivariate Analysis: Differences in Composition 
Our sample consists of 1,651 households in the years 2003 and 2004 and 2,622 households in 
2005, and we observe 104 purchases of endowment insurance in 2003/2004 before the tax 
reform (Consumer Group I), and 143 purchases for 2005 (Consumer Group II). These 
numbers represent a decrease in purchases from 6.3% to 5.5%, a good reflection of the 
decrease in new endowment insurance business from 2004 to 2005 experienced by the 
German market as a whole (Figure 1). To test the significance of compositional differences, 
we calculate the cross-sectional means of all variables for Consumer Group I and Consumer 
Group II and conduct a standard t test for the hypothesis that the difference in means equals 
zero. This hypothesis is rejected for 20 of 63 variables, that is, significant differences in 
composition are observed for 32% of the variables (see Table 3).5 We now compare selected 
characteristics of the two consumer groups in more detail and comment on their significance. 
 
Age: For both groups, endowment insurance purchases by age (see Figure 5) follow the 
hump-shaped pattern often observed for life insurance demand (see, e.g., Sommer, 2005). The 
difference in mean age (44.59 years vs. 45.21 years) is not significant, but the age distribution 
of Consumer Group I is more compressed than the age pattern of Consumer Group II, which 
is nicely illustrated by the estimated polynomial trend lines in Figure 6. The trend line for 
Consumer Group I is more arched, and its peak lies more to the left than that of Consumer 
Group II. That is, Consumer Group I contains a higher share of individuals aged 30 to 50, 
whereas Consumer Group II contains both more very young respondents (below age 25) and 
more individuals aged 55 and older. 
 
                                                 
5 For this calculation, we use the Stata command “ttest.” This command does not allow for weights. Mean values 
calculated for weighted and unweighted data differ only marginally. 
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Figure 5 






20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Raw Data Consumer Group I Raw Data Consumer Group II
Polyn. Trend Consumer Group I Polyn. Trend Consumer Group II
 
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 2nd 
degree polynomial trend lines added. 
 
Education: We expect demand for endowment insurance to be closely related to education 
level. Knowledge about financial matters is crucial to understanding complex product features 
and evaluating the consequences of the 2005 tax reform on the financial attractiveness of 
endowment insurance. Figure 6 shows the levels of school-leaving certificates for the two 
groups. In Consumer Group I, most household heads have a university entrance diploma 
(38%), followed by a low school degree (34%), and an intermediate degree (28%). After the 
tax reform, this composition is turned on its head: households with a university entrance 
diploma now form the minority (28%; the difference is significant at the 10% level) and those 
with an intermediate degree have the highest share (37%). The share of respondents with a 
low school degree remains stable (35%). 
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Figure 6 







Low schooling Intermediate 
schooling
High schooling
Consumer Group I Consumer Group II  
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 
 
Occupational Training: Another indicator of education is occupational training, which is 
illustrated in Figure 7. Both groups have similar (small) shares of household heads with no 
occupational education or working as civil servants, but Consumer Group II has a 
significantly lower share of university graduates—only 11% compared to 22% in Consumer 
Group I. Instead, Consumer Group II contains more households with vocational training. 
 
Figure 7 











Consumer Group I Consumer Group II  
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 
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Figure 8 shows five additional socio-demographic characteristics. Consumer Group I has a 
higher share of households without children and a significantly lower share of East Germans 
(14%, Consumer Group II: 26%). The groups are similar with respect to gender, marital 
status, and employment status. 
 
Figure 8 









Consumer Group I Consumer Group II
 
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 
 
Income: Figure 9 shows the two consumer groups sorted by income quintiles. The clear 
majority of respondents who bought endowment insurance before the tax reform (Consumer 
Group I) belongs to the highest (5th) income quintile. This income level and the 4th income 
quintile are significantly less well represented in Consumer Group II; in this group, we see 
much higher shares of households in the first and second income quintiles. Accordingly, net 
incomes of Consumer Group I (€2,863) and Consumer Group II (€2,413) differ significantly.  
 
Wealth: The types of asset classes held by respondents indicate to some extent household risk 
attitude. Figure 10 shows the shares of respondents holding different types of asset classes; 
respondents can check as many options as apply. Consumer Group I holds significantly more 
wealth (€52,558) than Consumer Group II (€40,683) and can therefore hold more assets in 
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every asset class. Significant differences are observed for “Savings account” and for the more 
risky asset types—equity and real estate funds, bonds, and innovative financial products. 
 
Figure 9 



















Consumer Group I Consumer Group II  
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 
 
Figure 10 




















Consumer Group I Consumer Group II
 
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 
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Saving Motives: In the SAVE survey, respondents indicate the subjective importance of 
various saving motives on a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (very important). Figure 
11 illustrates the results. Old-age provision and precautionary saving are the most important 
saving motives for both groups. Comparing the two groups, we see that precautionary saving 
(and children’s education) is significantly more important in Consumer Group II. A 
significant negative difference is observed for the saving motive real estate purchase. 
 
Figure 11 











Consumer Group I Consumer Group II
 
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 
 
Risk Attitude: Buyers of endowment insurance before the German Retirement Income Act are 
much less risk-averse than buyers of endowment insurance after the tax reform: Consumer 
Group I has a significantly higher risk-seeking coefficient than Consumer Group II (no 
graph). Other indicators of risk aversion support this finding: more individuals in Consumer 
Group II consider themselves as “planner types” or “decent decision makers.” 
 
21 
Other Character Traits: Figure 12 shows how respondents assess themselves on seven 
character traits. Consumer Group I has a slightly higher share of respondents who declare 
themselves as being optimistic and open to change (difference is significant at the 10% level); 
consequently, fewer households in this groups see themselves as pessimistic. The two groups 
are similar with respect to the other character traits. 
 
Figure 12 










Consumer Group I Consumer Group II
 
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 
 
Financial Literacy: Ideally, endowment insurance purchasers should have some basic 
understanding of financial concepts such as compounding, inflation, and diversification. The 
SAVE questionnaire includes three questions on these topics suggested by Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2006); see Table 2 in the Appendix for the question wording. Figure 13 gives the 
proportions of endowment insurance buyers who correctly answered one of these questions, 
and the share of respondents who answered all three correctly.6 Both consumer groups are 
                                                 
6 SAVE includes questions on financial literacy from SAVE 2007 on, but the panel structure can be used to allot 
answers given to the financial literacy questions in SAVE 2007 to respondents in SAVE 2005 and 2006. Since 
not all first-time endowment insurance buyers stay in the sample until SAVE 2007, data on financial literacy 
cover a sample that is 600 observations (22%) smaller than the original sample. 
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fairly financially literate. They receive very similar results in the question on compounding. 
Endowment insurance purchasers in Consumer Group II (after the tax reform) are 
significantly better at calculating real interest rates and do slightly worse on the question 
regarding diversification. Both groups have similar shares of respondents who answered all 
three questions correctly. 
 
Figure 13 







Compounding Inflation Diversification High score
Consumer Group I Consumer Group II
 
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 
 
Information Channel: To assess respondents’ information sources for financial decision 
making, Figure 14 identifies those with whom respondents discuss financial issues. Clear 
differences are observed: Consumer Group II discusses financial issues much more often with 
a financial advisor (significant), relatives (significant), friends, or colleagues. In contrast, 
Consumer Group I predominantly chooses none of the options (significant), which indicates 
















Relatives Friends Colleagues Neighbors Professional 
financial adviser
None of the 
above
Consumer Group I Consumer Group II
 
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). 
 
Multivariate Regression Analysis: Differences in Effects 
The previous section revealed significant differences in composition between Consumer 
Group I that bought endowment insurance before enactment of the German Retirement 
Income Act on January 1, 2005 and Consumer Group II that bought such insurance in the year 
after the reform. In this section, multivariate regression analysis is employed to compare the 
effects of external variables on endowment insurance purchase decisions when 
interdependencies between variables are controlled for. We now consider a subset of the 
variables analyzed in the previous section; that is, we select those variables with the most 
relevant information content. For example, we only consider “married” and ignore “married, 
living separately”, “single”, “divorced”, and “widowed”. The dependent variable—
endowment insurance purchase in a given year—is binary; therefore a probit model is used to 
explain the purchase decision. This analysis includes SAVE respondents who do not own 
endowment insurance and first-time endowment insurance buyers. We cannot include 
respondents who already own endowment insurance since SAVE does not allow for the 
identification of additional endowment insurance purchases in the years before 2005. 
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Separate Probit Regression Models for Consumer Group I and Consumer Group II 
The straightforward approach to comparing the effects of external factors on endowment 
insurance demand is to run two separate cross-sectional regressions for the period before and 
the period after the tax reform. So, based on the previous sections, we estimate the following 
model separately for Consumer Group I and Consumer Group II: 
yi = β0 + β1 x1i + β0 x2i + … + βk xki + εi   for i = 1, 2, …, N (1)
where yi is the binary (0/1) decision of household i to buy endowment insurance, xki is an 
independent variable, k is the number of independent variables, and εi is an iid disturbance 
term. The set of independent variables includes typical sociodemographic and economic 
variables established in the life insurance literature as well as additional factors such as 
psychological traits and household evaluation of typical product features of endowment 
insurance (see Figure 4). 
 
Estimation results are shown in Table 4. According to McFadden’s Pseudo R² (McFadden, 
1973), the model fit is better for Consumer Group I. Four variables exert significant effects on 
endowment insurance purchases before and after the tax reform: households owning a 
building society contract or equity and real estate funds buy endowment insurance more often, 
the motive of “old-age provision” has a positive effect, and having a goal to “pay off debt” 
reduces demand.  
 
Some variables have a significant effect only in Consumer Group I, that is, on consumers who 
bought endowment insurance before the tax reform: 
• Age and Age²: We observe the expected hump shape pattern (see bivariate analysis). 
• East Germans buy significantly less endowment insurance. 
• Contact with a tax advisor fosters endowment insurance demand. 
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• Households that own bonds or innovative financial instruments more likely buy 
endowment insurance. 
 
Other variables are significant only for households that bought endowment insurance after the 
tax reform: 
• Married couples are more likely to buy endowment plans. 
• The presence of children increases endowment insurance demand. 
• University graduates are less likely to buy endowment insurance. 
• Advice from financial professionals increases endowment insurance demand. 
• Financially literate households are more likely to purchase endowment plans (correct 
answers given to questions on compounding and inflation). 
• Households seeking to cover dependents are more likely to buy endowment insurance 
(a “bequest” motive). Households that try to take advantage of state subsidies in order 
to increase their savings buy less endowment insurance after the tax reform. 
 
Pooled Probit Regression Model for Consumer Group I and Consumer Group II 
Results of these separate regressions help assess the significance of effects of external factors 
before and after the tax reform. A direct comparison of probit coefficients across regressions, 
however, is difficult. To test for the significance of differences in effects, a pooled probit 
regression model is conducted that includes interaction terms for all independent variables. 
The use of interaction terms makes it possible to discover whether the effects differ 
significantly between the two groups: 
yi = β0 + γ1δ  + (β1 + γ1δ) x1i + (β2 + γ2δ) x2i + … + (βk + γkδ) xki + εi for   i = 1, 2, …, N (2)
where yi is again the binary decision of household i to buy endowment insurance, xki is an 
independent variable, k is the number of independent variables, and εi is an iid disturbance 
term. δ is a dummy variable indicating group membership; it is equal to 0 for respondents 
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who bought endowment insurance before the tax reform (Consumer Group I) and equal to 1 
for Consumer Group II. Thus, the β coefficients in Equation (2) indicate the “main effect” of 
the independent variables on the endowment insurance purchase decision of respondents in 
Consumer Group I. Significant “main effects” are observed for East Germans, advice from tax 
counsel, asset holdings, risk attitude, and saving motivation (see Table 5 in the Appendix); in 
all cases, the estimated coefficients match the direction of effects observed in the separate 
probit regressions. 
 
In the pooled regression model, differences between the two consumer groups are indicated 
by significant interaction terms. However, the interpretation of interaction terms in probit 
models is not as straightforward as in OLS regressions. In particular, the sign and strength of 
interaction effects can vary across respondents—in contrast to the OLS regression where there 
is one single interaction coefficient for all observations. We use the procedure suggested by 
Norton et al. (2004) to compute the magnitude, sign, and statistical significance of interaction 
effects in our probit model. Table 6 summarizes these results for the interaction effects found 
to be significant and their respective standard errors of the pooled regression analysis: being a 
university graduate, “East German,” and owning innovative financial instruments. We find 
that the strength of effects varies widely across respondents. The mean interaction effect for 
East Germans is again positive, but smaller than in the case of the separate regressions. The 
same holds for the direction and size of the mean effects of a university degree and ownership 
of innovative financial instruments. 
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A STYLIZED CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TWO CONSUMER GROUPS 
Results of the t tests and the probit regressions show that consumers who bought endowment 
insurance before the tax reform and those who purchased it afterward are dissimilar with 
respect to a variety of characteristics that go beyond differences that could be attributed to 
chance. Results of our empirical analysis suggest the following stylized characterization of 
the two consumer groups: 
 
Consumer Group I: Bivariate results suggest that Consumer Group I is slightly younger and 
has a higher share of highly educated households—both in terms of school-leaving certificate 
and tertiary education. A large share of this group is in the highest income quintile. Consumer 
Group I relies less on outsiders’ advice when it comes to financial issues and seems a little 
more risk-seeking than Consumer Group II. In terms of financial market activity, Consumer 
Group I contains a higher proportion of respondents who buy equity, bonds, and financial 
innovations. The separate regression analysis confirms the results of the bivariate findings. In 
the pooled regression case, significant differences with respect to having a university degree, 
being East German, and owning innovative financial instruments persist. These results hint at 
an active, well-informed, above-average earning, and opportunity-seeking consumer group 
that reacted to the announced tax reform by quickly transforming information into action 
(“arbitrageurs”). The fact that East Germans are under-represented in this group indicates that 
15 years after reunification differences between East and West Germans still persist—
differences that are not explained by income, wealth, education, or other key control 
variables. 
 
Consumer Group II: In contrast, according to the bivariate analysis, Consumer Group II is 
constituted by a larger share of older households with low to medium education. This 
consumer group relies more on relatives, friends, colleagues, and professionals for financial 
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advice than does Consumer Group I. Bequest motives and old-age provision are more 
important in this group, and a higher share of households actually has children. Results of the 
multivariate regression analysis support the results of the bivariate analysis: Consumer Group 
II is more interested in the typical product features of endowment insurance and is less 
sensitive to adverse tax changes (“stragglers”). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Results of our empirical analysis suggest that two different groups of consumers were active 
in the German insurance market: opportunity-seeking “arbitrageurs” before the 2005 income 
tax reform and “stragglers” afterwards. However, the latter group (i.e., consumers interested 
in the typical product features and less sensitive to adverse tax changes) most likely also 
bought endowment insurance in the two years before the tax reform. So we actually observe 
in Consumer Group I a mixture of these buyers and of arbitrageurs that enter the market 
before the tax reform. From that we can expect much more pronounced characteristics for 
these arbitrageurs whose characteristics superpose those of the stragglers and lead to the 
significant differences observed between Consumer Group I and Consumer Group II. 
 
Further differences could be expected if the SAVE data set would allow us to include 
households that bought a second or third endowment life insurance policy into the analysis. 
We would expect to find more high-income households (because they could afford another 
endowment insurance policy), better educated/financial literate households, and more West 
Germans (because they had more time to buy endowment insurance). In summary: we would 




The German Retirement Income Act of 2005 severely compromised the financial 
attractiveness of endowment insurance—a policy that has been a bestseller in the German life 
insurance market for decades. Based on rich micro data, we compare the sociodemographic, 
economic and psychological characteristics of the endowment insurance buyers in the years 
before and after the tax reform. We observe significant differences—both in composition and 
effects—between the two consumer groups. t tests for a wide range of consumer 
characteristics indicate that disparities are associated with levels of education, risk attitude, 
and sources of financial information. Results of different multivariate probit regressions 
support these findings: characteristics of Consumer Group I hint at active, well-informed, 
above-average earning, and opportunity-seeking households that might have accelerated the 
decision to buy endowment insurance in face of the forthcoming tax reform. Consumer Group 
II is found to incorporate a large share of households that seek typical product features, such 
as coverage of dependents or investment in a low risk asset. 
 
Our study adds to the mixed literature on the impact of tax incentives on life insurance 
demand. We can confirm key findings of a recent study by Sauter, Walliser, and Winter 
(2010); focusing on the 2000 German income tax reform, these authors find tax incentives to 
have a strong influence on consumer’s life insurance demand. Our findings, additionally, 
suggest education to be an important determinant of consumers’ reaction to such policy 
changes: those with higher education and higher income appear to have reacted to the 
changing tax environment by accelerating the decision to purchase this product. Those who 
were less informed might have missed this opportunity.  
 
Our findings thus have important implications for regulatory authorities that seek to influence 
household consumption and saving decisions with tax incentives. When designing and 
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implementing tax reforms, information is key to fostering appropriate consumer reaction. 
Results of this study imply the need for more effective and broader-based communication 
with respect to tax modifications in order to avoid discrimination against certain sections of 
the population. Regulatory authorities need to ensure that such information is accessible to 
and understandable by all segments of the population. Buyers of financial products, in turn, 
need to ensure that they are in possession of information necessary to make an appropriate 
decision; in a society where individuals are becoming increasingly responsible for their own 




Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Sociodemographic consumer characteristics 
Age Age of head of household respondent 
Gender DV 
Household size Number of household members 




Low school-leaving certificate DV, Secondary school [Haupt-/ Volks-schule] 
Mid school-leaving certificate DV, Junior high school [Realschule] 
High school-leaving certificate DV, High school [Abitur, Fachhoch-
schulreife] 




East German DV 
Economic consumer characteristics  
Net income Household net income per month 
1st income quintile DV, Range: 0–1,100 € 
2nd income quintile DV, Range: 1,106–1,690 € 
3rd income quintile DV, Range: 1,700–2,300 € 
4th income quintile DV, Range: 2,304–3,000 € 
5th income quintile DV, Range: 3,001–40,000 € 
Wealth Household net wealth = Assets held in savings 
accounts, building society contracts, bonds, 
equity and real estate funds, innovative 
financial instruments, and private pension 
contracts 
Savings account/Building society 
contract/Bonds/Equity and real estate 
funds/Financial innovations /Debt 
DV indicating ownership 
Real estate owner DV 
Psychological/behavioral consumer characteristics 
Saving motive: Bequest/Debt/Old-age 
provision/Major purchase/Children’s 
education/Precautionary saving/Real estate 
purchase/Use state subsidies/Traveling 
Importance of saving motive; Range from 0 = 
“not important at all” to 10 = “very important” 
Risk-seeking coefficient Risk-seeking attitude (min = 0; max = 40) 
Character: Calm/Set in his or her ways/Open 
to change/Optimistic/Pessimistic/Self-
confident/Happy 
Character self-assessment; Range from 0 = 




Table 1 (continued) 
Variable Definition 
Character: Planner type Character self-assessment; Range from 0 = 
“live for the moment” to 10 = “plan the future”
Character: Decent decision maker Character self-assessment; Range from 0 = 




DV, = 1 if the corresponding question is 
answered correctly 
Financial literacy score Mean score on financial literacy questions 
(min = 0; max = 3) 
Financial literacy high score DV, = 1 if all financial literacy questions are 
answered correctly 
Tax advisor DV, = 1 if household has tax bill prepared by 
tax advisor 
Financial conversations with 
colleagues/friends/neighbors/relatives/none 
of the above 
DV 
Financial conversations with financial 
advisors 
DV, = 1 if household receives financial advice 
from financial advisors at banks, insurance 
companies, or financial intermediaries 
Financial conversations with 
nonprofessionals 
DV, = 1 if household receives financial advice 
from friends, relatives, colleagues, or 
neighbors 
Follow financial advice How strongly does respondent follow advice 
from financial advisor, range from 0 = “not at 
all” to 10 = “fully” 




Questions on Financial Literacy 
Compounding “Suppose you had 100€ in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% 
per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the 
account if you left the money to grow: more than 102€, exactly 102€, less 
than 102€?” 
Inflation “Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year 
and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more 
than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this 
account?” 
Diversification “Do you think that the following statement is true or false? Buying a single 
company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” 
Source: SAVE 2005 Questionnaire (translated from German).
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Table 3 







in Means t-Stat. p-Value  
Sociodemographic consumer characteristics 
Age 44.59 45.21 0.62 -0.44 0.66  
Gender (female) 0.51 0.52 0.01 -0.12 0.90  
Household size 3.09 2.91 -0.18 1.02 0.31  
Number of children 1.65 1.94 0.29 -1.60 0.11  
Married 0.68 0.68 -0.00 0.07 0.94  
Married, living separately 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.70 0.49  
Single 0.16 0.17 0.01 -0.23 0.82  
Divorced 0.13 0.10 -0.03 0.71 0.48  
Widowed 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.70 0.49  
Low school-leaving certificate 0.34 0.35 0.01 -0.21 0.83  
Mid school-leaving certificate 0.28 0.37 0.09 -1.51 0.13  
High school-leaving certificate 0.38 0.28 -0.10 1.74 0.08 * 
No vocational training 0.10 0.10 -0.00 -0.05 0.96  
Vocational training 0.62 0.71 0.09 -1.62 0.11  
University degree 0.23 0.11 -0.12 2.53 0.01 *** 
Civil servant 0.13 0.08 -0.05 1.06 0.29  
Self-employed 0.10 0.07 -0.03 0.74 0.46  
East German 0.14 0.26 0.12 -2.19 0.03 ** 
Economic consumer characteristics 
Net income 2,863 2,413 -450 2.07 0.04 ** 
1st income quintile 0.12 0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.93  
2nd income quintile 0.13 0.17 0.04 -0.85 0.39  
3rd income quintile 0.22 0.24 0.02 -0.43 0.67  
4th income quintile 0.18 0.27 0.09 -1.65 0.10 * 
5th income quintile 0.35 0.20 -0.15 2.69 0.01 *** 
Wealth 52,558 40,683 -11,875 2.04 0.04 ** 
Savings account 0.70 0.55 -0.15 2.40 0.02 ** 
Building society contract 0.49 0.45 -0.04 0.56 0.58  
Bonds 0.21 0.08 -0.13 3.12 0.00 *** 
Equity and real estate funds 0.45 0.29 -0.16 2.71 0.01 *** 
Real estate 0.62 0.52 -0.10 1.42 0.16  
Financial innovations 0.13 0.04 -0.08 2.44 0.02 ** 
Debt 0.49 0.57 0.08 -1.18 0.24  
Real estate owner 0.62 0.52 -0.10 1.42 0.16  
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in Means t-Stat. p-Value  
Psychological/behavioral consumer characteristics 
Saving motive       
Bequest 2.88 3.45 0.57 -1.42 0.16  
Old-age provision 7.82 8.24 0.42 -1.42 0.16  
Major purchase  5.20 5.74 0.54 -1.60 0.11  
Pay off debt 5.48 5.80 0.32 -0.63 0.53  
Children’s education 5.37 6.27 0.90 -2.21 0.03 ** 
Precautionary saving 7.33 7.92 0.60 -2.19 0.03 ** 
Real estate purchase 5.64 4.78 -0.87 1.64 0.10 * 
Use state subsidies 5.03 4.78 -0.25 0.53 0.60  
Traveling 4.67 4.70 0.03 -0.07 0.94  
Risk-seeking coefficient  16.61 9.20 -7.41 6.28 0.00 *** 
Character:       
Calm 6.28 6.13 -0.15 0.45 0.65  
Set in his/her ways 6.08 6.01 -0.07 0.20 0.84  
Open to change 6.88 6.39 -0.49 1.72 0.09 * 
Optimistic 7.11 6.73 -0.38 1.31 0.19  
Pessimistic 3.03 3.50 0.47 -1.50 0.14  
Self-confident 6.53 6.60 0.07 -0.27 0.79  
Happy 7.42 7.28 -0.14 0.55 0.58  
Planner type 6.60 6.87 0.27 -1.03 0.30  
Decent decision maker 5.46 5.61 0.15 -0.48 0.63  
Financial literacy:       
Compounding 0.94 0.94 0.00 0.06 0.95  
Inflation 0.89 0.96 0.07 -1.89 0.06 * 
Diversification 0.69 0.67 -0.02 0.27 0.79  
Mean on all three questions 2.52 2.57 0.05 -0.52 0.60  
Financial conversations       
with financial advisor 0.35 0.48 0.13 -2.15 0.03 ** 
with colleagues 0.08 0.12 0.04 -1.08 0.28  
with friends 0.27 0.31 0.04 -0.77 0.44  
with neighbors 0.01 0.03 0.02 -1.28 0.20  
with relatives 0.24 0.36 0.12 -1.96 0.05 ** 
with none of the above 0.40 0.21 -0.19 3.38 0.00 *** 
Follow financial advice 3.08 3.12 0.04 -0.23 0.82  
Number of observations 104 143     
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (imputed data). A one-sided t- test is 
used to test whether the difference in means is zero (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
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Table 4 
Results of Separate Probit Regressions for Purchase of Endowment Insurance Before 
Enactment of the German Retirement Income Act on January 1, 2005, and Afterward 
Consumer Group I Consumer Group II 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err.  Coeff. Std. Err.  
Age 0.0884 0.0528 * 0.0021 0.0321  
Age² -0.0010 0.0006 * 0.0000 0.0004  
Female -0.0977 0.1547  -0.0251 0.1039  
Married 0.1407 0.2223  0.2234 0.1199 * 
Number of children -0.0405 0.0697  0.0913 0.0397 ** 
East German -0.7113 0.2160 *** 0.0477 0.1156  
High school-leaving 
certificate -0.1067 0.2240  0.1533 0.1360  
University degree 0.4012 0.2529  -0.4386 0.1841 ** 
Unemployed 0.1230 0.1849  -0.1247 0.1155  
Income       
1st quintile 0.0594 0.3124  -0.0939 0.1681  
2nd quintile -0.0673 0.2607  0.0120 0.1560  
4th quintile 0.0785 0.2340  0.0966 0.1463  
5th quintile 0.0597 0.2415  0.0330 0.1709  
Wealth 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Wealth² 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Savings account -0.1374 0.1808  0.1484 0.1068  
Building society contract 0.4171 0.1735 ** 0.3803 0.1102 *** 
Bonds 0.5767 0.2766 ** 0.2465 0.2009  
Equity and real estate funds 0.5410 0.1948 *** 0.2973 0.1305 ** 
Financial innovations 0.9507 0.3480 *** 0.0656 0.2450  
Real estate owner 0.1794 0.1713  -0.0256 0.1106  
Saving motives       
Bequest 0.0288 0.0297  0.0370 0.0185 ** 
Old-age provision 0.0600 0.0364 * 0.0538 0.0248 ** 
Major purchase 0.0020 0.0325  0.0348 0.0228  
Pay off debt -0.0495 0.0231 ** -0.0456 0.0144 *** 
Children’s education -0.0058 0.0289  0.0132 0.0185  
Precautionary saving -0.0171 0.0372     
Real estate purchase -0.0074 0.0227     
Use state subsidies 0.0226 0.0259  -0.0286 0.0166 * 
Traveling -0.0052 0.0300  -0.0196 0.0194  
Financial literacy       
Compounding 0.4869 0.3125  0.3436 0.1891 * 
Inflation -0.2155 0.2520  0.4878 0.2061 ** 
Diversification -0.1286 0.1733  -0.0392 0.1075  
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Table 4 (continued) 
Consumer Group I Consumer Group II 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err.  Coeff. Std. Err.  
Risk-seeking coefficient -0.0186 0.0066 *** -0.0041 0.0069  
Tax advisor 0.3076 0.1664 * 0.1471 0.1042  
Financial conversations       
with nonprofessionals -0.0952 0.1587  0.1308 0.1028  
with financial advisor 0.0428 0.1657  0.1734 0.1028  
Constant -3.5512 1.2717 *** -3.0695 0.7736 *** 
Number of observations 923 1,770 
Pseudo R² 0.2567 0.1123 
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (weighted and imputed data). * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5 
Results of Pooled Probit Regression for Purchase of Endowment Insurance Before Enactment 
of the German Retirement Income Act on January 1, 2005, and Afterward 
 Primary Effect 2005 Interaction Term 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err.  Coeff. Std. Err.  
Age 0.0861 0.0521 * -0.0757 0.0613  
Age² -0.0010 0.0006 * 0.0009 0.0007  
Female -0.1198 0.1500  0.0675 0.1823  
Married 0.1421 0.2186  0.0726 0.2488  
Number of children -0.0488 0.0677  0.1553 0.0779  
East German -0.6913 0.2116 *** 0.7378 0.2415 (*) 
High school-leaving 
certificate -0.0489 0.2165  0.1884 0.2553  
University degree 0.3628 0.2435  -0.7853 0.3032 (*) 
Not employed 0.1230 0.1801  -0.2729 0.2135  
Income       
1st quintile -0.0091 0.3157  -0.1096 0.3606  
2nd quintile -0.0852 0.2586  0.1051 0.3000  
4th quintile 0.0296 0.2262  0.0216 0.2660  
5th quintile 0.0169 0.2300  -0.0103 0.2808  
Wealth 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Wealth² 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Savings account -0.1584 0.1756  0.3109 0.2048  
Building society contract 0.3782 0.1675 ** -0.0125 0.1992  
Bonds 0.5375 0.2635 ** -0.3599 0.3292  
Equity and real estate funds 0.5457 0.1864 *** -0.2231 0.2251  
Financial innovations 0.9204 0.3426 *** -0.9458 0.4204 (*) 
Real estate owner 0.1683 0.1684  -0.1872 0.2007  
Saving motives       
Bequest 0.0208 0.0288  0.0187 0.0341  
Old-age provision 0.0553 0.0349  0.0113 0.0432  
Major purchase 0.0027 0.0318  0.0407 0.0391  
Pay off debt -0.0496 0.0225 ** 0.0037 0.0267  
Children’s education -0.0041 0.0281  0.0119 0.0336  
Precautionary savings -0.0115 0.0363  0.0074 0.0444  
Real estate purchase -0.0020 0.0220  -0.0014 0.0263  
Use state subsidies 0.0244 0.0250  -0.0561 0.0299  
Traveling -0.0038 0.0294  -0.0168 0.0351  
Financial literacy       
Compounding 0.4677 0.3029  -0.1004 0.3573  
Inflation -0.2542 0.2455  0.7101 0.3177  
Diversification -0.1577 0.1670  0.0899 0.1983  
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Table 5 (continued) 
 Primary Effect 2005 Interaction Term 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err.  Coeff. Std. Err.  
Risk-seeking coefficient -0.0168 0.0064 *** 0.0136 0.0093  
Tax advisor 0.2922 0.1604 * -0.1366 0.1903  
Financial conversations:       
with nonprofessionals -0.0635 0.1543  0.1829 0.1846  
with financial advisor 0.0285 0.1597  0.1398 0.1892  
Constant -3.4523 1.2644 *** 0.1644 1.4889  
Number of observations 2,693      
Pseudo R² 0.1570      
Note: Please see Table 6 for a summary of the interaction effects. Own calculation based on 




Summary of Significant Interaction Effects of Pooled Probit Regression for Purchase of 
Endowment Insurance Before Enactment of the German Retirement Income Act on January 1, 
2005, and Afterward 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Interaction effect 0.0571 0.0535 0.0002 0.2866 East German 
Std. Error 0.0877 0.0638 0.0010 0.3168 
Interaction effect -0.0946 0.0719 -0.3090 -0.0005 University degree 
Std. Error 0.1060 0.0512 0.0010 0.3620 
Interaction effect -0.1697 0.0968 -0.3643 -0.0027 Financial innovations 
Std. Error 0.2160 0.0993 0.0048 0.5213 
Note: Own calculation based on SAVE 2005 and 2006 (imputed data). Number of 
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